4 * Bremner and dkg are co-hosting a BoF at [debconf](https://summit.debconf.org/debconf15/meeting/217/improving-privacy-and-security-for-notmuch-mail/).
6 * The meeting is Monday 2015-08-17, 1700-1800
8 * Video streaming should be [available](https://wiki.debconf.org/wiki/DebConf15/Videostream/Amsterdam)
14 Moving parts for secure e-mail
29 * wrong key selection during composition
30 * reply (message mode defaults)
32 * webmail authentication/authorization (muliple users?)
33 * webmail message escaping (XSS, etc)
35 * terminal escape sequences
38 ### usability as security?
40 * indexing encrypted mail
41 * Memory Hole protected headers
42 * key selection indicators during compositoin
48 * based on moving part
55 -------------------------
59 One of (at least my) primary motivations for working on Notmuch is reducing my dependence on cloud services, and supporting the secure sending and receiving of signed and encrypted mail. Like any realworld piece of software, notmuch is far from perfect, and several areas related to privacy and security could clearly be improved. During this BoF we'd like to plan out some topics to work on in followup hacking sessions. Anyone is welcome, even if they don't feel like hacking on notmuch. Potential topics of discussion andhacking include:
60 * S/MIME signatures and encryption
61 * Improving the security of the Emacs MML mime composer
62 * Searching of GPG encrypted mail
63 * Auditing and fixing "webbug" style problems in front ends
64 * Making notmuch build reproducibly
70 * S/MIME signatures and encryption
72 * integration with other keyrings
73 * signature only (easyish) versus encryption (more work)
74 * Improving the security of the Emacs MML mime composer
75 * automated "encrypt-when-i-have-keys-available" mode or other convenience functions?
76 * can an adversary force signatures based on quoted text?
77 * generate memory-hole-style messages
78 * Searching of GPG encrypted mail
79 * possible implementation mechanism: "notmuch reindex --with-filter=decrypt"
80 * Auditing and fixing "webbug" style problems in front ends
81 * can we instruct emacs to restrict all network access from notmuch?
82 * what other frontends might call out to the network?
83 * Making notmuch build reproducibly
84 * https://reproducible.debian.net/rb-pkg/unstable/amd64/notmuch.html
85 * Protect against spoofed signature verification?
86 * how do we deal with multipart messages where only a subtree is signed?
87 * are other sorts of spoofing possible?
88 * read and display memory-hole-style messages
89 * "safe" ways to display html parts (e.g. without text/plain alternatives)