X-Git-Url: https://git.notmuchmail.org/git?a=blobdiff_plain;f=util%2Fcrypto.c;h=3f8ac25a0cd952eb5e62dddf2ce3ef2b556cc693;hb=80728a95e6fd8bd1c4a4f8dd8040984ab5c4b04a;hp=da9256f27869c679bc1a647762475add868a3c16;hpb=096d45a878ba9606f1677f66d346b14c3c274fa5;p=notmuch

diff --git a/util/crypto.c b/util/crypto.c
index da9256f2..3f8ac25a 100644
--- a/util/crypto.c
+++ b/util/crypto.c
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ GMimeObject *
 _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
 			 notmuch_decryption_policy_t decrypt,
 			 notmuch_message_t *message,
-			 g_mime_3_unused(GMimeCryptoContext* crypto_ctx),
 			 GMimeMultipartEncrypted *part,
 			 GMimeDecryptResult **decrypt_result,
 			 GError **err)
@@ -41,8 +40,7 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
     if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_FALSE)
 	return NULL;
 
-    /* the versions of notmuch that can support session key decryption */
-#if HAVE_GMIME_SESSION_KEYS
+    /* try decryption with session key if one is stashed */
     if (message) {
 	notmuch_message_properties_t *list = NULL;
 
@@ -66,7 +64,6 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
 	if (ret)
 	    return ret;
     }
-#endif
 
     if (err && *err) {
 	g_error_free (*err);
@@ -78,26 +75,103 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
 
     if (attempted)
 	*attempted = true;
-#if (GMIME_MAJOR_VERSION < 3)
-#if HAVE_GMIME_SESSION_KEYS
-    gboolean oldgetsk = g_mime_crypto_context_get_retrieve_session_key (crypto_ctx);
-    gboolean newgetsk = (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_TRUE && decrypt_result);
-    if (newgetsk != oldgetsk)
-	/* This could return an error, but we can't do anything about it, so ignore it */
-	g_mime_crypto_context_set_retrieve_session_key (crypto_ctx, newgetsk, NULL);
-#endif
-    ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt(part, crypto_ctx,
-					     decrypt_result, err);
-#if HAVE_GMIME_SESSION_KEYS
-    if (newgetsk != oldgetsk)
-	g_mime_crypto_context_set_retrieve_session_key (crypto_ctx, oldgetsk, NULL);
-#endif
-#else
     GMimeDecryptFlags flags = GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE;
     if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_TRUE && decrypt_result)
 	flags |= GMIME_DECRYPT_EXPORT_SESSION_KEY;
     ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt(part, flags, NULL,
 					     decrypt_result, err);
-#endif
     return ret;
 }
+
+static int
+_notmuch_message_crypto_destructor (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto)
+	return 0;
+    if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+	g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+_notmuch_message_crypto_t *
+_notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx)
+{
+    _notmuch_message_crypto_t *ret = talloc_zero (ctx, _notmuch_message_crypto_t);
+    talloc_set_destructor (ret, _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeSignatureList *sigs)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    /* Signatures that arrive after a payload part during DFS are not
+     * part of the cryptographic envelope: */
+    if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+    if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+	g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+
+    /* This signature list needs to persist as long as the _n_m_crypto
+     * object survives. Increasing its reference counter prevents
+     * garbage-collection until after _n_m_crypto_destroy is
+     * called. */
+    msg_crypto->sig_list = sigs;
+    if (sigs)
+	g_object_ref (sigs);
+
+    if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL)
+	msg_crypto->signature_encrypted = true;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *payload, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto || !payload)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    /* only fire on the first payload part encountered */
+    if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+    /* the first child of multipart/encrypted that matches the
+     * encryption protocol should be "control information" metadata,
+     * not payload.  So we skip it. (see
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847#page-8) */
+    if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum == GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) {
+	const char *enc_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (parent, "protocol");
+	GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (payload);
+	if (ct && enc_type) {
+	    const char *part_type = g_mime_content_type_get_mime_type (ct);
+	    if (part_type && strcmp (part_type, enc_type) == 0)
+		return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	}
+    }
+
+    msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    /* see the rationale for different values of
+     * _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t in util/crypto.h */
+    if (!msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+	msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL;
+    else if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE)
+	msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}