#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof (arr) / sizeof (arr[0]))
-void _notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto))
+void
+_notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto))
{
}
GError **err)
{
GMimeObject *ret = NULL;
+
if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_FALSE)
return NULL;
- /* the versions of notmuch that can support session key decryption */
+ /* try decryption with session key if one is stashed */
if (message) {
notmuch_message_properties_t *list = NULL;
GMimeDecryptFlags flags = GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE;
if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_TRUE && decrypt_result)
flags |= GMIME_DECRYPT_EXPORT_SESSION_KEY;
- ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt(part, flags, NULL,
- decrypt_result, err);
+ ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (part, flags, NULL,
+ decrypt_result, err);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+_notmuch_message_crypto_destructor (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+ if (! msg_crypto)
+ return 0;
+ if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+ g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+ if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
+ talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+_notmuch_message_crypto_t *
+_notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx)
+{
+ _notmuch_message_crypto_t *ret = talloc_zero (ctx, _notmuch_message_crypto_t);
+
+ talloc_set_destructor (ret, _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor);
return ret;
}
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeSignatureList *sigs)
+{
+ if (! msg_crypto)
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+ /* Signatures that arrive after a payload part during DFS are not
+ * part of the cryptographic envelope: */
+ if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+ g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+
+ /* This signature list needs to persist as long as the _n_m_crypto
+ * object survives. Increasing its reference counter prevents
+ * garbage-collection until after _n_m_crypto_destroy is
+ * called. */
+ msg_crypto->sig_list = sigs;
+ if (sigs)
+ g_object_ref (sigs);
+
+ if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL)
+ msg_crypto->signature_encrypted = true;
+
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *payload, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum)
+{
+ const char *protected_headers = NULL;
+ const char *forwarded = NULL;
+ const char *subject = NULL;
+
+ if (! msg_crypto || ! payload)
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+ /* only fire on the first payload part encountered */
+ if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+ /* the first child of multipart/encrypted that matches the
+ * encryption protocol should be "control information" metadata,
+ * not payload. So we skip it. (see
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847#page-8) */
+ if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum == GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) {
+ const char *enc_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (parent, "protocol");
+ GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (payload);
+ if (ct && enc_type) {
+ const char *part_type = g_mime_content_type_get_mime_type (ct);
+ if (part_type && strcmp (part_type, enc_type) == 0)
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true;
+
+ /* don't bother recording anything if there is no cryptographic
+ * envelope: */
+ if ((msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL) &&
+ (msg_crypto->sig_list == NULL))
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+ /* Verify that this payload has headers that are intended to be
+ * exported to the larger message: */
+
+ /* Consider a payload that uses Alexei Melinkov's forwarded="no" for
+ * message/global or message/rfc822:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-smime-header-signing-05#section-4 */
+ forwarded = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (payload, "forwarded");
+ if (GMIME_IS_MESSAGE_PART (payload) && forwarded && strcmp (forwarded, "no") == 0) {
+ GMimeMessage *message = g_mime_message_part_get_message (GMIME_MESSAGE_PART (payload));
+ subject = g_mime_message_get_subject (message);
+ /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
+ } else {
+ /* Consider "memoryhole"-style protected headers as practiced by Enigmail and K-9 */
+ protected_headers = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (payload, "protected-headers");
+ if (protected_headers && strcasecmp ("v1", protected_headers) == 0)
+ subject = g_mime_object_get_header (payload, "Subject");
+ /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
+ }
+
+ if (subject) {
+ if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
+ talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
+ msg_crypto->payload_subject = talloc_strdup (msg_crypto, subject);
+ }
+
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+ if (! msg_crypto)
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+ /* see the rationale for different values of
+ * _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t in util/crypto.h */
+ if (! msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+ msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL;
+ else if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE)
+ msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL;
+
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
projects / notmuch / blobdiff