]> git.notmuchmail.org Git - notmuch/blobdiff - util/crypto.c
emacs: Add new option notmuch-search-hide-excluded
[notmuch] / util / crypto.c
index 99104e788b4d9132490e039d39c2b38e435e92b8..156a6550c20afef00a6bb5eaab94e8ba435cbfbd 100644 (file)
 
 #include "crypto.h"
 #include <strings.h>
+#include "error_util.h"
 #define unused(x) x __attribute__ ((unused))
 
 #define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof (arr) / sizeof (arr[0]))
 
-void _notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto))
+void
+_notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto))
 {
 }
 
@@ -32,11 +34,12 @@ GMimeObject *
 _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
                         notmuch_decryption_policy_t decrypt,
                         notmuch_message_t *message,
-                        GMimeMultipartEncrypted *part,
+                        GMimeObject *part,
                         GMimeDecryptResult **decrypt_result,
                         GError **err)
 {
     GMimeObject *ret = NULL;
+
     if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_FALSE)
        return NULL;
 
@@ -45,17 +48,30 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
        notmuch_message_properties_t *list = NULL;
 
        for (list = notmuch_message_get_properties (message, "session-key", TRUE);
-            notmuch_message_properties_valid (list); notmuch_message_properties_move_to_next (list)) {
+            notmuch_message_properties_valid (list); notmuch_message_properties_move_to_next (
+                list)) {
            if (err && *err) {
                g_error_free (*err);
                *err = NULL;
            }
            if (attempted)
                *attempted = true;
-           ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (part,
-                                                     GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE,
-                                                     notmuch_message_properties_value (list),
-                                                     decrypt_result, err);
+           if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part)) {
+               ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part),
+                                                         GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE,
+                                                         notmuch_message_properties_value (list),
+                                                         decrypt_result, err);
+           } else if (GMIME_IS_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part)) {
+               GMimeApplicationPkcs7Mime *pkcs7 = GMIME_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part);
+               GMimeSecureMimeType type = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_get_smime_type (pkcs7);
+               if (type == GMIME_SECURE_MIME_TYPE_ENVELOPED_DATA) {
+                   ret = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_decrypt (pkcs7,
+                                                                GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE,
+                                                                notmuch_message_properties_value (
+                                                                    list),
+                                                                decrypt_result, err);
+               }
+           }
            if (ret)
                break;
        }
@@ -76,9 +92,154 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
     if (attempted)
        *attempted = true;
     GMimeDecryptFlags flags = GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE;
+
     if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_TRUE && decrypt_result)
        flags |= GMIME_DECRYPT_EXPORT_SESSION_KEY;
-    ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt(part, flags, NULL,
-                                            decrypt_result, err);
+    if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part)) {
+       ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part), flags, NULL,
+                                                 decrypt_result, err);
+    } else if (GMIME_IS_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part)) {
+       GMimeApplicationPkcs7Mime *pkcs7 = GMIME_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part);
+       GMimeSecureMimeType p7type = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_get_smime_type (pkcs7);
+       if (p7type == GMIME_SECURE_MIME_TYPE_ENVELOPED_DATA) {
+           ret = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_decrypt (pkcs7, flags, NULL,
+                                                        decrypt_result, err);
+       }
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+_notmuch_message_crypto_destructor (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+    if (! msg_crypto)
+       return 0;
+    if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+       g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+    if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
+       talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+_notmuch_message_crypto_t *
+_notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx)
+{
+    _notmuch_message_crypto_t *ret = talloc_zero (ctx, _notmuch_message_crypto_t);
+
+    talloc_set_destructor (ret, _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor);
     return ret;
 }
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto,
+                                           GMimeSignatureList *sigs)
+{
+    if (! msg_crypto)
+       return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    /* Signatures that arrive after a payload part during DFS are not
+     * part of the cryptographic envelope: */
+    if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+       return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+    if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+       g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+
+    /* This signature list needs to persist as long as the _n_m_crypto
+     * object survives. Increasing its reference counter prevents
+     * garbage-collection until after _n_m_crypto_destroy is
+     * called. */
+    msg_crypto->sig_list = sigs;
+    if (sigs)
+       g_object_ref (sigs);
+
+    if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL)
+       msg_crypto->signature_encrypted = true;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+bool
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *part,
+                                          GMimeObject *parent, int childnum)
+{
+    const char *protected_headers = NULL;
+    const char *forwarded = NULL;
+    const char *subject = NULL;
+
+    if ((! msg_crypto) || (! part))
+       INTERNAL_ERROR ("_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload() got NULL for %s\n",
+                       msg_crypto? "part" : "msg_crypto");
+
+    /* only fire on the first payload part encountered */
+    if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+       return false;
+
+    /* the first child of multipart/encrypted that matches the
+     * encryption protocol should be "control information" metadata,
+     * not payload.  So we skip it. (see
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847#page-8) */
+    if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum ==
+       GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) {
+       const char *enc_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (parent, "protocol");
+       GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (part);
+       if (ct && enc_type) {
+           const char *part_type = g_mime_content_type_get_mime_type (ct);
+           if (part_type && strcmp (part_type, enc_type) == 0)
+               return false;
+       }
+    }
+
+    msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true;
+
+    /* don't bother recording anything if there is no cryptographic
+     * envelope: */
+    if ((msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL) &&
+       (msg_crypto->sig_list == NULL))
+       return false;
+
+    /* Verify that this payload has headers that are intended to be
+     * exported to the larger message: */
+
+    /* Consider a payload that uses Alexei Melinkov's forwarded="no" for
+     * message/global or message/rfc822:
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-smime-header-signing-05#section-4 */
+    forwarded = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "forwarded");
+    if (GMIME_IS_MESSAGE_PART (part) && forwarded && strcmp (forwarded, "no") == 0) {
+       GMimeMessage *message = g_mime_message_part_get_message (GMIME_MESSAGE_PART (part));
+       subject = g_mime_message_get_subject (message);
+       /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
+    } else {
+       /* Consider "memoryhole"-style protected headers as practiced by Enigmail and K-9 */
+       protected_headers = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "protected-headers");
+       if (protected_headers && strcasecmp ("v1", protected_headers) == 0)
+           subject = g_mime_object_get_header (part, "Subject");
+       /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
+    }
+
+    if (subject) {
+       if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
+           talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
+       msg_crypto->payload_subject = talloc_strdup (msg_crypto, subject);
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+    if (! msg_crypto)
+       return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    /* see the rationale for different values of
+     * _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t in util/crypto.h */
+    if (! msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+       msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL;
+    else if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE)
+       msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}