X-Git-Url: https://git.notmuchmail.org/git?p=notmuch;a=blobdiff_plain;f=util%2Fcrypto.c;h=c09f467b350b5d453e799d5b7941463544b411a0;hp=3f8ac25a0cd952eb5e62dddf2ce3ef2b556cc693;hb=HEAD;hpb=74919c226eafad4de6b3a823f83a8be970e77e24 diff --git a/util/crypto.c b/util/crypto.c index 3f8ac25a..156a6550 100644 --- a/util/crypto.c +++ b/util/crypto.c @@ -20,11 +20,13 @@ #include "crypto.h" #include +#include "error_util.h" #define unused(x) x __attribute__ ((unused)) #define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof (arr) / sizeof (arr[0])) -void _notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto)) +void +_notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto)) { } @@ -32,11 +34,12 @@ GMimeObject * _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted, notmuch_decryption_policy_t decrypt, notmuch_message_t *message, - GMimeMultipartEncrypted *part, + GMimeObject *part, GMimeDecryptResult **decrypt_result, GError **err) { GMimeObject *ret = NULL; + if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_FALSE) return NULL; @@ -45,17 +48,30 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted, notmuch_message_properties_t *list = NULL; for (list = notmuch_message_get_properties (message, "session-key", TRUE); - notmuch_message_properties_valid (list); notmuch_message_properties_move_to_next (list)) { + notmuch_message_properties_valid (list); notmuch_message_properties_move_to_next ( + list)) { if (err && *err) { g_error_free (*err); *err = NULL; } if (attempted) *attempted = true; - ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (part, - GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE, - notmuch_message_properties_value (list), - decrypt_result, err); + if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part)) { + ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part), + GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE, + notmuch_message_properties_value (list), + decrypt_result, err); + } else if (GMIME_IS_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part)) { + GMimeApplicationPkcs7Mime *pkcs7 = GMIME_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part); + GMimeSecureMimeType type = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_get_smime_type (pkcs7); + if (type == GMIME_SECURE_MIME_TYPE_ENVELOPED_DATA) { + ret = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_decrypt (pkcs7, + GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE, + notmuch_message_properties_value ( + list), + decrypt_result, err); + } + } if (ret) break; } @@ -76,20 +92,32 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted, if (attempted) *attempted = true; GMimeDecryptFlags flags = GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE; + if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_TRUE && decrypt_result) flags |= GMIME_DECRYPT_EXPORT_SESSION_KEY; - ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt(part, flags, NULL, - decrypt_result, err); + if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part)) { + ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part), flags, NULL, + decrypt_result, err); + } else if (GMIME_IS_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part)) { + GMimeApplicationPkcs7Mime *pkcs7 = GMIME_APPLICATION_PKCS7_MIME (part); + GMimeSecureMimeType p7type = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_get_smime_type (pkcs7); + if (p7type == GMIME_SECURE_MIME_TYPE_ENVELOPED_DATA) { + ret = g_mime_application_pkcs7_mime_decrypt (pkcs7, flags, NULL, + decrypt_result, err); + } + } return ret; } static int _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto) { - if (!msg_crypto) + if (! msg_crypto) return 0; if (msg_crypto->sig_list) g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list); + if (msg_crypto->payload_subject) + talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject); return 0; } @@ -97,14 +125,16 @@ _notmuch_message_crypto_t * _notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx) { _notmuch_message_crypto_t *ret = talloc_zero (ctx, _notmuch_message_crypto_t); + talloc_set_destructor (ret, _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor); return ret; } notmuch_status_t -_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeSignatureList *sigs) +_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, + GMimeSignatureList *sigs) { - if (!msg_crypto) + if (! msg_crypto) return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER; /* Signatures that arrive after a payload part during DFS are not @@ -130,45 +160,83 @@ _notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypt } -notmuch_status_t -_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *payload, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum) +bool +_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *part, + GMimeObject *parent, int childnum) { - if (!msg_crypto || !payload) - return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER; + const char *protected_headers = NULL; + const char *forwarded = NULL; + const char *subject = NULL; + + if ((! msg_crypto) || (! part)) + INTERNAL_ERROR ("_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload() got NULL for %s\n", + msg_crypto? "part" : "msg_crypto"); /* only fire on the first payload part encountered */ if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered) - return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS; + return false; /* the first child of multipart/encrypted that matches the * encryption protocol should be "control information" metadata, * not payload. So we skip it. (see * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847#page-8) */ - if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum == GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) { + if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum == + GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) { const char *enc_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (parent, "protocol"); - GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (payload); + GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (part); if (ct && enc_type) { const char *part_type = g_mime_content_type_get_mime_type (ct); if (part_type && strcmp (part_type, enc_type) == 0) - return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS; + return false; } } msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true; - return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS; + /* don't bother recording anything if there is no cryptographic + * envelope: */ + if ((msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL) && + (msg_crypto->sig_list == NULL)) + return false; + + /* Verify that this payload has headers that are intended to be + * exported to the larger message: */ + + /* Consider a payload that uses Alexei Melinkov's forwarded="no" for + * message/global or message/rfc822: + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-smime-header-signing-05#section-4 */ + forwarded = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "forwarded"); + if (GMIME_IS_MESSAGE_PART (part) && forwarded && strcmp (forwarded, "no") == 0) { + GMimeMessage *message = g_mime_message_part_get_message (GMIME_MESSAGE_PART (part)); + subject = g_mime_message_get_subject (message); + /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */ + } else { + /* Consider "memoryhole"-style protected headers as practiced by Enigmail and K-9 */ + protected_headers = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "protected-headers"); + if (protected_headers && strcasecmp ("v1", protected_headers) == 0) + subject = g_mime_object_get_header (part, "Subject"); + /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */ + } + + if (subject) { + if (msg_crypto->payload_subject) + talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject); + msg_crypto->payload_subject = talloc_strdup (msg_crypto, subject); + } + + return true; } notmuch_status_t _notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto) { - if (!msg_crypto) + if (! msg_crypto) return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER; /* see the rationale for different values of * _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t in util/crypto.h */ - if (!msg_crypto->payload_encountered) + if (! msg_crypto->payload_encountered) msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL; else if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE) msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL;