From 1fdc08d0ffab9b211861de5d148d0a79eae840bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Bremner Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 01:01:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] cli/crypto: treat failure to create a crypto context as fatal. Silently ignoring signed/encrypted parts seems like the wrong idea, and it also complicates future gmime-3.0 compatibility changes. --- mime-node.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mime-node.c b/mime-node.c index f719422e..7363e222 100644 --- a/mime-node.c +++ b/mime-node.c @@ -245,10 +245,12 @@ _mime_node_create (mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part) GMimeContentType *content_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type (part); const char *protocol = g_mime_content_type_get_parameter (content_type, "protocol"); cryptoctx = notmuch_crypto_get_context (node->ctx->crypto, protocol); + if (!cryptoctx) + return NULL; } /* Handle PGP/MIME parts */ - if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->decrypt && cryptoctx) { + if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->decrypt) { if (node->nchildren != 2) { /* this violates RFC 3156 section 4, so we won't bother with it. */ fprintf (stderr, "Error: %d part(s) for a multipart/encrypted " @@ -257,7 +259,7 @@ _mime_node_create (mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part) } else { node_decrypt_and_verify (node, part, cryptoctx); } - } else if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_SIGNED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->verify && cryptoctx) { + } else if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_SIGNED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->verify) { if (node->nchildren != 2) { /* this violates RFC 3156 section 5, so we won't bother with it. */ fprintf (stderr, "Error: %d part(s) for a multipart/signed message " -- 2.43.0